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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT CRAIL, HENRY M. 
SCHEURN and DANIEL S. 
BUSHNELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 
9291 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondents entered into a Stipulation concerning 
the Statement of Facts and issues raised which was intended 
to be in lieu of any other statement of the case. For this reason, 
it is felt that it was unnecessary for the Appellant to review 
the pleadings and allegations in connection with the First 
Cause of Action. Also, certain statements contained in the 
Appellant's Statement of the Case have not been determined; 
more particularly, on page 2 it states that the stock of Pru-
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dential was in fact worthless, which has not been determined. 
However, since the stipulated statement of facts is also set 
out in the Appellant's Brief, it is deemed unnecessary to further 
discuss these issues. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE STOCK ISSUED BY PRUDENTIAL OIL & MIN~ 
ERALS COMPANY WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
SECURITIES LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. Case Authority. 
B. Statutory Construction. 
C. Utah Attorney General Opinions. 
D. Practical Accepted Interpretation. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT IS BOUND BY ITS STIPULATION 
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK WAS HAN ISO~ 
LA TED TRANSACTION" AND MAY NOT NOW RAISE 
THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK BY PRUDENTIAL 
OIL & MINERALS COMPANY WAS ALSO EXEMPT AS 
AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION. 
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POINT IV 
1'HE APPELLANT CANNOT QUALIFY UNDER THE 
STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN IF THE SALE 
WERE UNAUTHORIZED AND HIS APPEAL SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE DISMISSED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STOCK ISSUED BY PRUDENTIAL OIL & MIN-
ERALS COMPANY WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
SECURITIES LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Since the Appeal raises the single question of whether the 
issuance of the stock was an isolated transaction exempt by 
virtue of the Securities Law, it is felt that the Statute involved 
should be specifically indicated. 
Section 61-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in part provides 
as follows: 
((SALES EXEMPTED FROM CHARTER.-Except 
as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this 
chapter shall not apply to the sale of any security in 
any of the following cases: 
t t ( 3) An isolated transaction in which any security 
is sold, offered for sale, subscription or delivery by the 
owner thereof, or by his representative for the owner's 
account; such sale or offer for sale, subscription or de· 
livery not being made in the course of repeated and 
successive transactions of a like character by such owner 
or on his account by such representative, and such 
owner or representative not being the underwriter of 
such security. The provisions of this subdivision shall 
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not apply in any case of sale where the issuer shall 
have taken the entire stock of a company in payment 
for mining claims, patent rights, copyrights, trade-
marks, process, lease, formula, oil lease, good will or 
any other property right or any other tangible or in-
tangible asset which may be construed as a promotion 
interest, or where funds receivable from the sale of 
such security may be used directly or indirectly for 
development purposes.'' 
A. Case Authority: 
There have been a few cases construing this prov1s1on; 
however, again it becomes a matter of statutory construction 
of the particular statute involved. An early annotation con-
tained in 87 ALR 42, involving Blue Sky Laws has not been 
supplemented or superseded concerning the issues involved 
in this discussion. There appears to be no Utah case which 
discusses this provision involving the issues herein raised. Most 
of the cases from other jurisdictions involved a discussion of 
this provision as to the questi9n of whether the statute was 
constitutional and most courts held that it was. However, 
in the case of People v. Pace, 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 Pac. 1089, 
the law was held unconstitutional as being a restriction upon 
the rights of ownership. In Brannan, Beckham & Co. v. 
Ramsaur, Georgia 1930, 152 S.E. 282, 287, the court ap-
parently had this issue presented to it but felt that a determi-
nation was not necessary in making its decision of that case. 
In so doing the court stated as follows: 
Uin these circumstances the sale could not be ex-
empted under Section 9 ( 1), irrespective of whether it 
was an isolated transaction as to the owner. In this 
view, it is unnecessary to determine whether an owner 
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who is also the issuer could claim the exemption pro-
vided by Section 9 ( 1) . 
''What we hold is that, whether an owner be the 
issuer or not, a sale made in his behalf by a regular 
broker or dealer is not an isolated transaction, since it 
was necessarily made in the course of repeated and 
successive transactions of a similar nature by such rep-
resentative of the owner.'' 
In the early case of Smith v. Crawford, Kan. 1929, 15 
S.W. 2d., 249, the court does make a distinction as between 
the corporation and the stockholder owner. However, it ap-
pears that there are peculiarities in the Kentucky law which 
makes this case distinguishable. In checking II Ken. Rev. St. 
Sec. 292.030, Exempt Transactions, the isolated transaction 
section is the same but there does not appear to be an indi-
vidual owner exemption. Although Notes and Annotations to 
Ken. Rev. St. 1944 Chapter 292 traces the legislation history 
of the section it doesn't show the exact status of the law as it 
\vas in 1929 when the case was divided. 
Although the case cited in one of the opinions of the Utah 
Attorney General may be distinguished because of the statute 
involved the court in Ersted vs. Hobart Howry Company, 
299 N.W. 66, 68, stated as follows: 
Ctit is immaterial whether the corporation or the 
defendant Wilson was the owner of the shares of 
stock acquired by the plaintiff or whether he was acting 
for himself or the corporation. Under the evidence, the 
sale of stock to the plaintiff was an isolated sale, not 
made in the course of repeated and successive sales of 
a similar nature and the prohibition of the statute did 
not apply to the transaction.'' 
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The Utah cases cited by the Appellant, more particularly 
those shown on Pages 10 and 11 of its brief; namely, Buttrey 
vs. Guaranteed Securities Company, (1931) 78 Utah 39; 300 
Pac. 1040; Hansen vs. Abraham Irrigation Company, 25 Pac. 
2nd 76; and Harper vs. Tri-State Motors, 58 Pac. 2nd 18, are 
not factually in point, nor do they raise or discuss the issue 
of Ia w here presented. Therefore, since there are no cases issued 
by the Utah Supreme Court construing these provisions the 
issue becomes one of first impression and becomes primarily a 
matter of statutory construction, taking into consideration the 
construction placed thereon by opinions of the Utah Attorney 
General and the practical accepted construction placed thereon 
by the members of the Bar of the State of Utah. 
B. Statutory Construction. 
It is the position of the Appellant that a corporation is 
not the owner of authorized unissued stock and, therefore, this 
exemption is not available to a corporation, but rather is avail-
able to the stockholders who own the stock. Although certain 
terms are defined by the statute, the word (towner" is not so 
defined. In Section 61-1-4 the word ((person" shall include a 
natural person, a corporation created under the laws of this 
state * * * * , a partnership, an association, a joint stock 
company, a trust, and any. unincorporated organization. 
In the late 1920's there was considerable activity involving 
the promotion, sale, and distribution of stocks leading up to 
the . crash which occurred in 1929. Other states enacted laws 
which were similar to the Securities Law in the State of Utah. 
More particularly, such a law was enacted in the following 
states: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Penn-
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sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. However, in 
checking the statutes in some of these states, there are various 
changes in connection with the isolated transaction provision. 
The last clause of the first sentence of the Utah Law limits 
the exemption by stating: 
((And such owner or representative not being the 
underwriter of such a security.'' 
In some states this restriction is broader in that it restricts 
the exemption by providing that it shall not apply to tcthe 
issuer or underwriter of such a security.'' Since the word issuer, 
which would clearly apply to the corporation, was specifically 
eliminated it is only logical that the legislature intended not 
to so limit the exemption as not applying to the corporation. 
Further, it may be argued if the word issuer was included 
in the restriction on the exemption, the definition of the word 
issuer as contained in sub-paragraph 5 of Section 61-1-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, is broad enough to include any private 
person who is the owner of the securities received from the 
corporation and, therefore, such an interpretation would also 
prohibit this exemption from being available to certain private 
persons and would in effect render the exemption of no effect. 
There is an additional restriction on the use of the exemp-
tion which further makes it clear that the legislature intended 
that this exemption would normally be available to the cor-
poration. After setting out the exemption, the Section pro-
vides further as follows: 
((The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply 
in any case of sale where the issuer shall have taken 
the entire stock of a company in payment for mining 
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claims, patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, process, 
lease, formula, oil lease, good will or any other prop-
erty right or any other tangible or intangible asset which 
may be construed as a promotion interest, or where 
funds received from the sale of such security may be 
used direct! y or indirect! y for development purposes.)) 
It is clear from the foregoing part of the law that the 
legislature felt it was necessary in certain circumstances to 
restrict this exemption so far as the issuer, or corporation, 
was concerned. If the Section was not intended to apply to 
the Company since it was not the owner of its securities, then 
there would be no need for this additional restriction. 
Looking further at the law as a whole, it will appear that 
the strained construction maintained by the Appellant would 
be inconsistent with such law. The Appellant maintains that 
this exemption is only for the individual stockholder rather 
than the company. However, if this contention is valid, the 
exemption contained in subparagraph (9) of the same section 
is not necessary. Part of that sub-paragraph (9) is as follows: 
(( ( 9) The sale, assignment, transfer or exchange by 
a natural person of any security issued and delivered 
by a corporation which at the time of such issue is 
lawfully qualified to do business in this state and at 
the time of such sale, assignment, transfer or exchange 
is in actual bona fide existence and actually engaged 
in the transaction of the principal business provided for 
by its Articles of Incorporation, if such natural person 
is a resident citizen of this state and the bona fide owner 
of such security * * * ." 
It is clear that the foregoing is intended to cover the 
individual stockholder. It would be unnecessary to have this 
provision if the isolated sale exemption as contained in sub-
10 
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paragraph 3 were to apply to the individual stockholder as 
now contended by the Appellant. Since the Legislature did 
include the individual stockholder exemption contained in 
sub-paragraph 9, it is the normal statutory construction to 
conclude that some different exen1ption must have been in-
tended by ((isolated transaction" provisions of sub-paragraph 3. 
In considering the purpose for the enactment of such 
laws, as will be more thoroughly discussed under Attorney 
General opinions, it is evide~t that the law was intended to 
protect the public generally, and that no such protection was 
intended or felt necessary in the situation of the company 
issuing stock not involving public offerings. 
The case law in the State of Utah does take the position 
that the Securities Law will be strictly construed. Guarantee 
Mortgage Co. vs. Wilcox, 62 Utah 184, 218 Pac. 133; Miller 
v. Stewart, 69 Utah 250, 253 Pac. 900; Willis vs. Spring Canyon 
Coal Co., 4 Utah 2d, 211. 
The isolated sale exemption was not restricted by the 
Legislature as against the issuer which would include the 
company as was done by other states in enacting comparable 
laws; the individual stockholder trading his stock is exempt 
by sub-paragraph 9 of the same section of the law, and it is, 
therefore, unnecessary to contend that the isolated sale exemp-
tion was intended to only apply to such individual stock-
holder; the isolated sale exemption specifically restricts the 
use of the exemption by the issuer in certain circumstances, 
thus indicating that the exemption is available in the normal 
circumstances, which would be the facts of this case; the law 
was intended to protect the public from public sales of stock; 
11 
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and since the cases of the State of Utah have indicated that 
the law shall be strictly construed, it is therefore submitted 
that on the issue of statutory construction alone the holding 
of the Trial Court to the effect that this exemption was avail-
able to Prudential Oil & Minerals Company under the facts 
of this case should be affirmed. 
C. Utah Attorney General 0 pinions 
The Securities Commissioners in the past have requested 
opinions concerning the availability of this exemption from 
the Utah Attorney General's Office. One of such opinions was 
issued on May 15, 1942, and is set forth in the appendix to this 
Brief. The distinction which the Appellant is attempting to 
assert on this appeal was not made by the Attorney General 
in that opinion. In fact, after a fairly lengthy discussion the 
Utah Attorney General quoted in part as follows: 
( (In the opinion of the General Counsel of the Securi-
ties & Exchange Commission, released January 4, 1935, 
it was held that if the size of the offering, or the number 
of units offered is so small that there is very little chance 
of repeated and successive transactions, and there would 
be a little probability of a distribution of the securities 
to the public generally and such an offering may only 
terminate in an isolated transaction. In considering the 
manner of offering the security, if the issuer enters 
into a few transactions with particular persons, the few 
transactions may be placed in the realm of isolated 
transactions more definitely than in the situation where 
the issuer engages a dealer or other machinery for the 
sale and distribution of the securities rather than by 
direct negotiation." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Attorney General therefore makes the analogy 
that the isolated transaction provision is comparable to the 
12 
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exemption in the U. S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 
\vhich exempts issues not involving a public offering. When 
the Attorney General talks about issuings and distributions, 
they are talking about stock being sold by the company and, 
therefore, they are taking the position that for this exemption 
the company is the owner of authorized unissued stock of the 
company. When one considers the purpose and intent of the 
legislation, it is clear that such a construction is the only valid 
one. 
In December, 1946, the Attorney General issued another 
opinion specifically discussing the issue of whether the issuance 
by the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company of 5% deben-
tures would be exempt under this provision. The precise issue 
was there raised as to whether the corporation could be an 
owner of securities issued by it and could claim the isolated 
sale exemption of sub-paragraph 3. It cannot be contended any 
more in this case than in the factual situation discussed by 
the Attorney General that the corporation is not the type of 
owner intended to be exempt under the provision. A 5% 
debenture is not any more owned by the corporation than 
the authorized unissued stock of the company. Yet, the 
Attorney General held in that opinion that the exemption 
was available to the company. A copy of that opinion is also 
set out in the appendix. An excerpt from that opinion 1s as 
follows: 
nThis act was obviously made for the purpose of 
protecting the public against the public offering for 
sale of securities which do not offer a sound investment. 
The isolated transactions exception was included be-
cause the Legislature evidently felt that where an offer 
was to be made only to a few individuals and not to the 
13 
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general public, such individuals would probably be in 
a better position than would the state to determine 
the backing of the particular security involved." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The part of the quotation from the opinion italicized 
referring to an offer being made under the circumstances can 
only be intended to mean an offer being made by the company. 
A debenture is a security. Stock of a company is a security. The 
debenture does not become valid until it has been delivered. 
Yet, in this case, the company has been held to be the owner 
of that debenture. Likewise, the company is the owner of its 
unauthorized unissued stock. 
A reading of these opinions, as well as others issued by 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, will indicate that the 
narrow construction now contended by the Appellant has not 
been adopted by that office, and should not be adopted by this 
court. 
D. Practical Accepted Interpretation. 
The Trial Court ruled that the isolated ·sale exemption 
was applicable to Prudential Oil & Minerals Company under 
the facts of this case. Judge Stewart M. Hanson was an active 
member of the Utah Securities Commission during the so-
called uranium boom when there was considerable activity 
involving that department. Consequently, it can be assumed 
that he became rather familiar with the law and the interpre-
tation being placed thereon. Certainly his experience in that 
field, as well as being a practicing attorney, and now a District 
Judge should be given considerable weight by this court. It 
is submitted that most of the practicing attorneys in the State 
of Utah have relied upon the Attorney General's opinions 
14 
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and have permitted, advised, and counseled corporations to 
issue stock in isolated transactions without securing prior 
approval from the Utah Securities Commission. In the case of 
Bateman vs. Board of Examiners, 7 Ut. 2d 221, 234; 332 P.2d 
381, 390, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
~~were we interpreting the statutes and constitutional 
provisions relating to the Board of Examiners for the 
first time we might br more impressed by arguments 
proposed by Education. However, history and experi-
ence have always been the very bone and sinew of the 
law. As stated by the great Justice Holmes: ~The life 
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.' " 
The narrow construction contended for by the Appellants 
\vould seem to require that even the stock issued by the com-
pany after its immediate incorporation to its incorporators 
and initial subscribers would not be exempt and, therefore, 
would require Securities Commission approval. Such an inter-
pretation would seriously impede the business pursuits of the 
State of Utah and complicate the corporate practice, both for 
attorneys and the public generally. Such was not the intent 
of the Legislature in enacting such a law, but rather as cited 
and indicated by the Attorney General, it was intended to 
protect the public where public sales and offering of stock 
were contemplated. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT IS BOUND BY ITS STIPULATION 
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK WAS (IAN ISO-
LA TED TRANSACTION" AND MAY NOT NOW RAISE 
THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
15 
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The Appellant now seeks for the first time on appeal to 
raise the issue of whether the issuance of Prudential Oil & 
Minerals Company was ((an isolated transaction." At the time 
of the Pre-Trial on September 29, 1959, (R. 9), Mr. Child 
stipulated as follows: 
ccln explanation of the plaintiff's complaint herein 
the plaintiff does not claim that these defendants 
participated in the issuance or offering of any other 
stock in this corporation; to-wit, the Prudential Oil and 
Mineral Company, other than the issuance of the stock 
to Fred B. Grube and W. D. Johnson, the plaintiff 
herein, and that this was a single transaction in stock 
for these 18 mining claims." 
There were two additional Pre-Trial Orders issued after 
this date, one on March 29, 1960 (R. 21-24) and April26, 1960, 
(R. 25-26). This stipulation was not subsequently changed. The 
issue was submitted on written briefs to the Trial Court 
based upon this stipulation of facts by counsel for the Appellant. 
Counsel should not now, therefore, be permitted to raise, or 
challenge this issue for the first time on appeal. The stock issued 
to Fred B. Grube, as well as toW. D. Johnson, was all handled 
in connection with the same transaction; more particularly, a 
conveyance was received from one of the Grube associates 
clearing title to the property, and stock was issued for equip-
ment used and then on the property, as well as the 18 mining 
claims. An Attorney General's opinion has ruled that even 
though the stock may be issued to more than one person, this 
would not render the issuance other than an isolated trans-
action if it arose out of the same negotiation involving the 
same parties. Factually it was an isolated sale and ethically 
counsel for the Appellant should not now attempt to change 
16 
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the issues upon which it stipulated at the time of Pre-Trial 
and which is contained in the stipulated statement of facts now 
presented to this court. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK BY PRUDENTIAL 
OIL & MINERALS COMPANY WAS ALSO EXEMPT AS 
AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION. 
As a result of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law made by the Court subsequent to the dismissal of the 
second cause of action involving the alleged illegal issuance 
of stock, it would appear that a second exemption is avail-
able to the Respondents to cover the issuance of said stock 
by the company. The Court in its decision stated: 
((THE COURT FINDS that the Iowa corporation 
owned the 18 claims legally and equitably and that 
the plaintiff was a stockholder. Plaintiff gave no con-
sideration for the Prudential stock, personally, although 
he took the stock in his own name. 
((Said stock apparently belonged to the Iowa cor-
poration. The plaintiff, in this way, acquired the 40,000 
shares of Prudential stock that belonged to the Iowa 
corporation. Plaintiff was not a party personally to the 
contract of exchange, and produced no evidence of 
being authorized to take title in himself for the stock." 
Based upon such factual determination, it would appear 
that the Appellant held the stock as constructive trustee for 
the benefit of Empire Mining Company, and that in fact, the 
Empire Mining Company was the equitable owner of the stock. 
Section 61-1-6 of Utah Code Annotated enumerates exemptions 
from the law. Sub-paragraph 5 is as follows: 
17 
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(<The sale, transfer or delivery to any bank, savings 
institution, trust company or insurance company, 01' 
to any corporation or to any broker or dealer; provided 
that such broker or dealer is actually engaged in buying 
and selling securities as a business." (Emphasis added). 
Since the issuance of the stock was in consideration of 
assets exchanged to Empire Mining Corporation and the 
stock ~(belonged to the Iowa corporation," it would appear 
that this issuance of stock was an issuance to a corporation 
and, therefore, is exempt under the foregoing section. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT CANNOT QUALIFY UNDER THE 
STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN IF THE SALE 
WERE UNAUTHORIZED AND HIS APPEAL SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE DISMISSED. 
Subsequent to the Trial Court dismissing the second cause 
of action on the basis that the issuance of the stock was exempt, 
as discussed above, another division of the Trial Court litigated 
certain factual issues which would show that the Appellant 
could not qualify under the statutory cause of action set forth 
in the second cause of action even if it had not been dismissed. 
In order to better understand the issues litigated by the 
Trial Court and upon which Findings of Fact were made, it 
is necessary to review briefly the nature in which this action 
was commenced. Initially the suit was brought by W. D. 
Johnson as Trustee for the stockholders of Empire Mining 
Company. Empire Mining Company was alleged to be the 
owner of the claims which were issued to Prudential Oil & 
Minerals in exchange for stock. Thereafter a proposed amend-
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ment to the pleadings was filed by the Appellant, wherein he 
sought to bring the action nindividually and as assignee of 
Empire Mining Corporation." In the pleadings it was alleged 
that the title of the company to the claims had been assigned to 
the Appellant. A first amended complaint was then filed in 
the name of the Appellant and the pleadings alleged that the 
properties were jointly owned by the Appellant and the Empire 
Mining Company. A second amended complaint was then 
filed in which the Appellant appeared as a party and Empire 
Mining Corporation. Finally a third amended complaint was 
filed in the individual name of the Appellant, wherein he 
alleged he was the owner of the 18 mining claims. At all 
points in the pleadings the real party in issue was raised by 
the Respondents. After three pre-trial hearings and pre-trial 
orders, the issue of whether the Appellant was the real party 
in interest and had any substantial interest, or title to the 
mining claims was tried before the Court. An extended trial 
was had and a considerable number of documents were intro-
duced in evidence, as well as considerable oral testimony. 
After the extended trial and considerable argument by 
counsel for the respective parties, the Trial Court rendered 
a decision dated and filed May 27, 1960, which is part of the 
Supplemental Record on Appeal. The Court in its own memo-
randum decision made the following statements: 
nThe plaintiff testified that title to the 18 claims was 
in the Iowa corporation until the exchange with Pru-
dential. He also testified that he was the Iowa corpo-
ration, and that the Iowa corporation only held the 
stock for the plaintiff's benefit. 
•cTHE COURT FINDS that the Iowa corporation 
owned the 18 claims legally and equitably and that the 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff was a stockholder. Plaintiff gave no conside-
ration for the Prudential stock, personally, although 
he took the stock in his own name. 
((Said stock apparently belonged to the Iowa cor-
poration. The plaintiff, in this way, acquired the 40,000 
shares of Prudential stock that belonged to the Iowa 
corporation. Plaintiff was not a party personally to the 
~ontract of exchange, and produced no evidence of 
being authorized to take title in himself for the stock. 
UThe plaintiff testified, in effect, that he put the title 
to the claims in the Iowa corporation to make it diffi-
cult for Grube-Harman Mining Company to press 
their claims, and also for the reason that there might 
be some need to probate his estate, if he died with the 
claims in his name. 
((The Iowa corporation issued its stock for said 
claims. It appears that the Iowa corporation was not 
set up as a Trustee in any respect, but was being held 
out to the world as the owner, legally and equitably, 
of said 18 claims." 
* * 
((THE COURT FINDS that the plaintiff had no 
interest in the Iowa corporate assets, except that of a 
stockholder, and that the Iowa corporation had both 
legal and equitable title to the 18 claims." 
* * * 
((THE COURT FINDS that the plaintiff is not the 
real party in interest. The case is dismissed with preju-
dice on the findings that the Plaintiff has no cause for 
action. The Court does not determine who does have a 
cause for action.'' 
Thereafter proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were prepared and objections were raised thereto. An 
amended set of Findings were then prepared, and again objec-
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tions were made and argument was had in each case. Finally 
the third set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
signed by the Court, but even then objection was made by 
the Appellant and after further argument, one paragraph of 
these Findings was deleted. In essence the Court finally found 
that the Empire Mining Company held the title to the property, 
and was either a valid corporation or a de facto corporation, 
but in any event the Appellant was estopped to challenge the 
validity of the corporate existence of Empire Mining Com-
pany. The Appellant on the other hand was just a stockholder 
of Empire Mining Company, which owned legal title to the 
18 mining claims, and which company conveyed the claims 
in exchange for stock of Prudential Oil & Minerals Co. The 
Court's Conclusions of Law in part is as follows: 
'' 5. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest of 
the first cause of action in the above-entitled law suit 
since he did not individually own said 18 mining claims, 
and if any fraud were perpetrated it was not against 
the plaintiff causing him to depart with any valuable 
consideration to his detriment/' (Emphasis added). 
(See Supplemental Record on Appeal.) 
The second cause of action is a statutory cause of action 
predicated upon Section 61-1-25, Utah Code Annotated, which 
in part provides as follows: 
"Sales in violation of chapter-Remedies-Liability 
-Limitation of action-Every sale or contract for sale 
made in violation of any of the provisions of this 
chapter shall be voidable at the election of the pur-
chaser, and the person making such sale or contract 
for sale and every director, officer or agent, for such 
seller who shall have participated or aided in any way 
in making such sale shall, upon tender to the seller of 
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the securities sold or of the contract made, be jointly 
and severally liable to such purchaser for the full 
amount paid by him. (Emphasis added.) 
Assuming for the sake of this argument that there was 
a violation of the law and that the officers of Prudential are 
jointly and severally liable, it is submitted that their liability is 
rr to such purchaser for the full amount paid by him.n In this 
instance, in view of the Findings made by the Trial Court, it 
is obvious that this Appellant paid no consideration for the 
stock, and, therefore, he has not been damaged and the issues 
raised on the Appeal are moot questions. 
1 AM. JUR. 424, Actions, Section 31, provides in part as 
follows: 
CCWrong Without Damage.-As a necessary corollary 
of the rule that wrong and damage must concur, it is 
a maxim of the law that wrong without damage, or 
injura absque damno, does not constitute a good cause 
of action, as the law furnished a remedy only for such 
wrongful acts as result in injury." 
67 C.J.S. 899, Parties, Section 6, provides in part as 
follows: 
{(Rights may not be enforceable except in the name 
of the injured party, so that one who sues in his own 
name must ordinarily show an injury to himself." 
c COne without pecuniary loss has no judicial standing 
in the courts." Norah vs. Crawford, La. 49 So. 2d 751. 
Since the Appellant has not appealed from the Findings 
of the Trial Court that he did not depart with any valuable 
consideration to his detriment, such a finding is res judicata 
and binding on the Appellant. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Mathews vs. Mathews, 1942, 132, P.2d 111, 114, stated: 
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··The foundation principle upon which the doctrine 
of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be 
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; 
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried 
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the 
judgment of the court so long as it remains unreversed, 
should be conclusive upon the parties." 
Since the Appellant has no pecuniary interest and that 
issue has been finally determined against him, and since by 
the very wording of the statutory cause of action which he 
attempts to assert, his only recovery would be for consideration 
paid by him, it is respectfully submitted that the appeal should 
be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court has held that the issuance of the stock 
was an exempt transaction since it was an isolated transaction 
within the 1neaning of the Securities Law. The statutory con-
struction, Attorney General's opinions, and the practical 
accepted interpretation placed on the law by the Securities 
Commission and the Attorneys of the State warrant the affirm-
ing of such a holding. There is an additional exemption in 
that the stock was in essence issued to a corporation. Even, 
however, if there was a violation of the law the Appellant 
cannot comply with the cause of action created by the statute. 
Therefore, the Court should either rule that the sale was exempt, 
or dismiss the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BUSHNELL, CRANDALL & BEESLEY 
GORDON I. HYDE 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents 
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APPENDIX 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Office of the Attorney General 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Grover A. Giles 
Attorney -General 
S. D. Huffaker 
Deputy Attorney General 
May 15, 1942 
Department of Business Regulation 
Securities Commission 
BUILDING 
Attention Lawrence Taylor, Director 
Gentlemen: 
A. John Brennan 
Zar E. Hayes 
A. U. Miner 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Herbert F. Smart 
Assistants 
By your letter May 6, 1942, you have requested the opinion 
of this office in interpretation of the provisions of Section 
81-1-6(3), Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pertaining to ex-
emption of securities from registration when sold in isolated 
transactions. The subject section is worded as follows: 
((An isolated transaction in which any security is sold, 
offered for sale, subscription or delivery by the owner 
thereof, or by his representative for the owner's ac-
count; such sale or offer for sale, subscriptions or de-
livery not being made in the course of repeated and 
successive transactions of a like character by such owner 
or on his account by such representative, and such 
owner or representative not being the underwriter of 
such security. The provisions of this subdivision shall 
not apply in any case of sale where the issuer shall 
have taken the entire stock of a company in payment 
for mining claims, patent rights, copyrights, trade-
marks, process, lease, formula, oil lease, good will or 
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any other property right or any other tangible or in-
tangible asset which may be construed as a promotion 
interest, or where funds received from the sale of such 
security may be used directly for development pur-
poses." 
At the outset, it may be pertinent to note that not only 
does the section refer to isolated transactions, but also further 
qualifies the exemption by providing that such sales shall not 
be made in the course of repeated and successive transactions 
of a like character. This phraseology may, in some instances, 
be questioned from the consideration of vagueness. However, 
when applied to particular facts and circumstances, the portent 
or its meaning resolves itself into more definite form and the 
ordinary issuer or dealer can understand therefrom what he 
is permitted to do and what he is forbidden to do. 
In the case of Kneeland vs. Emerton, 280 Mass. 3 71, 183 
N.E. 155, the Court made these very interesting comments: 
(I ••• Sales of securities manifestly constitute the (trans-
actions'. The words (repeated and successive' are used by way 
of contrast to the word (isolated' employed earlier in the same 
sentence. In such context an (isolated' sale means one standing 
alone, disconnected from any other, and (repeated and suc-
cessive' mean transactions undertaken and performed one after 
the other. We think that two sales of securities, made one 
after the other within a period of such reasonable time as to 
indicate that one general purpose actuates the vendor, and that 
the sale promote the same aim and are not so detached and 
separated as to form no part of a single plan, would be ( re-
peated and successive transactions'. The term (reasonable time', 
which is necessarily implied in that connection from the words 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the statute, has no fixed and unvarying definition, but it 
is a term well known to the common law and has a long history 
in judicial decision. Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267; Howe 
v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284, 287; Campbell v. Shoriskey, l/0 
Mass. 63, 67, 48 N.E. 1070; Lydig v. Breman, 177 Mass. 212, 
219, 53 N.H. 696; Plymouth Country Trust Co. v. Seanlan, 
227 Mass. 71, 116 N.E. 468. Thus it is ta well-settled common-
law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the 
definition as to which estimates might differ.' Cline v. Frink 
Dairy Co.,. 274 U.S. 459, 47 S. Ct. 681, 685, 71 L. Ed. 1146. 
It is not essential to the validity of the statute that it prescribe 
the exact period of time within which (repeated and successive 
transactions' must occur because they must be within a reason· 
able time fixed by the common law in the light of all the cir 
cumstances. The phrase (transactions of like character' in ils 
context refers to t sale of any security' mentioned earlier in the 
same sentence. The dominant factor is (transactions', and not 
the particular security. But the transactions must be confined 
to sales of such securities as fall within the prohibition of 
section 5 and are not excluded from its operation by section 
3 (b) to (p) inclusive, or other provisions of said chapter 
11 OA. The words t like character' import resemblance in salient 
features and not identity in all particulars. Bliss v. Bliss, 221 
Mass. 301, 109 N.E. 148, L.R.A. 1916A, 889. Thus con-
strued, we think that section 3 (a) is not open to the objection 
of vagueness on constitutional grounds . . . '' 
Following a consideration of the principles laid down 
by the Court, which are expressions of the general trend of 
authority, it is apparent that the question you have submitted 
in your letter as to whether the subject section Hrefers to One 
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sale only or if more than one sale,'' how much such sales could 
be classified as isolated - may not be positively answered; 
since it is evident that the number of the transactions is alone 
not controlling in all cases, for it is apparent that other factors 
may control such as the type of offer that is made by the issuer, 
the question of the number of units offered, the manner of 
offering and the relation of the issuer to the offerees. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Federal Securities Act, as amended, now provides for 
an exemption of transactions by an issuer not involving any 
public offering, and, it is evident and apparent that it was the 
intention of the Legislature of this State, when referring to 
isolated transactions not being made in the course of repeated 
and successive transactions, to distinguish an isolated offer 
or sale from a public offer or sale. What could constitute a 
public offering is essentially a question of fact in which all 
surrounding circumstances are of moment. Of course, any 
attempt to dispose of a particular security must be considered 
as an offer, but if there are preliminary negotiations with a 
substantial number of persons or prospective purchasers in 
order to convince such persons of the value of the securities, 
then, undoubtedly, such a transaction when consummated is 
the termination of a public offering and could not be held to 
be an isolated sale. Likewise, if the offering is restricted to a 
particular group or class, if there is a large number of persons 
in the group or class, the offering may be made to a sufficient 
number of persons to constitute a public offering and not an 
isolated transaction. 
In the opinion of the General Counsel of the Securities 
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and Exchange Commission, released January 24, 1935; it was 
held that if the size of the offering or the number of units 
involved is so small that there is very little chance of repeated 
and successive transactions then there would be little proba-
bility of a distribution of the securities to the public generally 
and such an offering may only terminate in an isolated trans-
action. In considering the manner of offering the security, if 
the issuer enters into a few transactions with particular persons, 
the few transactions may be placed in the realm of isolated 
transactions more definite! y than in the situation where the 
issuer engages a dealer or other machinery for the sale and 
distribution of the securities rather than by direct negotiation. 
As indicated in the case of Black vs. Solano, 114 Cal. App. 
170, 299 P. 843, the fact that the securities may be sold as 
a private sale is beside the point for it was held that it was 
the manner of offering and not the type of sale which would 
control; and, it was remarked in this opinion that the proof 
of sales of like interest to other parties under all the circum-
stances, would have warranted the court in drawing an infer-
ence that the offer was made to anyone interested in a chance 
to share in a promotional venture, and was controlling. 
In the case of Ersted vs. Hobart Howry Company, 299 
N.W. 66, the following precedent was established: 
((Under statutory provision that Blue Sky Law shall apply 
to (isolated sales' of securities by the issuer or owner thereof, 
such sales not being made in course of (repeated and successive' 
sales of securities of issue by same issuer or owner, the words 
repeated and successive are used by way of contrast to (iso-
lated', and in such context an (isolated' sale means one standing 
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alone, disconnected from any other, and ~isolated and succes-
sive sales' mean transactions undertaken and performed one 
after the other, and to sales of securities made one after the 
other within a period of such reasonable time as to indicate 
that one general purpose actuates the vendor and that such 
sales promote the same aim and are not so detached and sepa-
rated as to form no part of a single plan, are repeated and suc-
cessive sales." 
Therefore, it is my opinion that the question presented 
may not be absolutely settled at this writing, but that the statute 
involved and the principles herein set forth may only serve 
to advise you of the various elements of particular transactions 
which may be considered by your Commission in the determi-
nation of whether or not a particular transaction or series of 
transactions is exempt from the provisions of the Act. 
AJB:bhl 
Yours very truly, 
29 
Is/ Grover A. Giles 
Attorney General 
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UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SALT LAKE CITY 
December 23, 1946 
Mr. Lawrence Taylor, Director 
Securities Commission 
Department of Business Regulation 
BUILDING 
Dear Mr. Taylor: 
You have referred to this office for an opinion, information 
regarding a proposed issuance and sale of $500,000 in 5 per 
cent debentures by Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company. You 
desire to know whether or not it will be necessary for the 
company to register these securities before offering them for 
sale. 
According to the information in the possession of this 
office $200,000 of these debentures will be issued on January 
1, 1947, and additional sums up to the $500,000 will be issued 
from time to time thereafter. There will be no underwriter 
of the proposed debentures and no commission will be paid 
for the sale of the same. The entire issue is to be sold to the 
stockholdders and officers of the McWane Cast Iron Pipe 
Company in Birmingham, Alabama, of which company the 
Pacific State Cast Iron Pipe Company is a subsidiary. No offer 
of any kind will be made to the general public. 
Section 82-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides in 
part as follows: 
{!Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions 
of this chapter shall not apply to the sale of any security in 
any of the following cases: 
( 3) An isolated transaction in which any security 
is sold, offered for sale, subscription or delivery by 
the owner thereof, or by his representative for the own-
er's account; such sale or offer for sale, subscription or 
delivery not being made in the course of repeated and 
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successive transactions of a like character by such owner 
or representative not being the underwriter of such 
security. 
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply 
in any case of sale where the issuer shall have taken 
the entire stock of a company in payment for mining 
claims, patent rights, copyrights, trade-marks, process, 
lease, formula, oil lease, good will or any other prop-
erty right or any other tangible or intangible asset 
which may be construed as a promotion interest, or 
where funds received from the sale of such security may 
be used directly or indirectly for development pur-
poses.'' 
It is the opinion of this office that in order to be an 
isolated transaction it is not necessary that a transaction be 
the only one of its kind. In order to determine whether or not 
a particular transaction actually comes within this section, it 
is necessary to consider the entire scope of the Securities Act. 
This act was obviously made for the purpose of protecting the 
public against the public offering for sale of securities which 
do not offer a sound investment. The isolated transactions 
exception was included because the Legislature felt that where 
an offer was to be made only to a few individuals and not to 
the general public, such individuals would probably be in 
a better position than would the state to determine the backing 
of the particular security involved. 
Such is obviously the case in the proposed sale of these 
debentures. They are to be offered for sale only to officers and 
stockholders of the parent company of the issuer. Such persons 
are obviously in a position where they know or should know 
the backing of such securities. In view of the fact that the 
offer is to be made only to these individuals and in view of the 
fact that there are to be but a limited number of sales,this 
office is of the opinion that this security need not be registered. 
CLR:ki/sda 
31 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) Grover A. Giles 
GROVER A. GILES 
Attorney General 
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